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NOTES
"Bonded & Insured?":
The Future of Mandatory Insurance
Coverage and Disclosure Rules for
Kentucky Attorneys
BY NICHOLAS A. MARSH*
I. INTRODUCTION
t is no secret that in today's legal environment, lawyers are becoming
increasingly susceptible to malpractice claims. Many attorneys and
law firms focus on avoiding these claims, and malpractice avoidance has
become the subject of many continuing legal education seminars, law
review articles, and other legal writings.' Lawyers in every area of legal
practice are being forced to guard against seemingly imminent malpractice
claims.2 Frequently lawyers get so involved with protecting themselves,
they forget their clients need protection as well.'
. J.D. expected 2005, University of Kentucky. B.A. 2002, University of
Louisville. I wish to thank Attorney Ruth H. Baxter, Crawford & Baxter, P.S.C.,
Professor Eugene Gaetke, and Ms. Nancy Fritz for their help with this Note. I
would also like to thank Justice James Keller, Kentucky Supreme Court; Bruce
Davis, Kentucky Bar Association; and Asa "Pete" Gullett, Lawyers Mutual
Insurance Company of Kentucky, for meeting with me and offering his insights on
this topic. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents, George C. Marsh
and Patricia J. Marsh, for their continued support and encouragement.
' See Ronald E. Mallen, Cutting Through the Malpractice Maze, 15 BRIEF 10,
10-11 (1986).
2 See id.
3 Nicole A. Cunitz, Note, Mandating Malpractice Insurance for Lawyers: Is
There a Possibility of Public Protection Without Compulsion?, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 637, 653 (1995).
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An attorney's most fundamental duty is to help clients understand their
legal rights and enforce them.' This duty adheres whether the lawyer is
performing a routine title examination or representing the client in a
personal injury case. Regardless of the area of practice, a lawyer must
adhere to a minimum standard of care. Although this burden may seem
rather light, an attorney's deviation from that standard of care, may have
lasting consequences for the client.
Due to the high likelihood that today's attorney will face a malpractice
claim at some point in his or her career,' many attorneys carry professional
liability insurance.6 If an insured attorney deviates from the required
standard of care and the client is damaged as a result, the insurance
provides a source of recovery. On the other hand, if an uninsured7 attorney
commits malpractice, a client could be left without an adequate remedy.
Two basic solutions have evolved to protect clients from uninsured
attorneys. The first solution, which has been implemented in Oregon,
requires that all attorneys carry a minimum amount of professional liability
insurance.' This mandatory coverage plan provides absolute client
protection. The second solution requires attorneys to make information
regarding their professional liability insurance coverage available to
potential and current clients.9 This is based on the notion that, given
adequate information about an attorney, clients can make an informed
decision as to whether hiring a particular attorney is a risk they are willing
to accept.'0 Several states have adopted such plans, generically referred to
as mandatory disclosure."
4 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., R. 1.3 cmt. (2003) ("A lawyer
should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction, or
personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical
measures are required to vindicate a client's course or endeavor. A lawyer must
also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal
in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
Mallen, supra note 1, at 10.
6See James E. Towery, The Case in Favor of Mandating Disclosure of Lack of
Malpractice Insurance, PROF. LAW, Winter 2003, at 22 (stating that as many as
one-third of American lawyers in private practice lack malpractice insurance, which
suggests that at least a majority of America's lawyers do carry malpractice
insurance).
' For purposes of this Note, the term "uninsured" will also refer to attorneys
who are underinsured.
8 OR. REV. STAT. § 9.080(2) (2001).
9 Towery, supra note 6, at 22.
10 See id. at 23.
" See infra notes 116-133 and accompanying text.
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Despite the surge in malpractice claims, Kentucky has adopted neither
a mandatory coverage nor a mandatory disclosure system. The purpose of
this Note is to explore whether either of these solutions would be appropri-
ate for Kentucky. Part II examines the prevalence of uninsured attorneys in
the legal profession.12 Part Ill details possible solutions to the problems
posed by legal malpractice, addressing both Oregon's plan of mandatory
coverage and the various mandatory disclosure regimes. 3 The mandatory
disclosure regimes are first considered broadly with an analysis of the
theoretical underpinnings of those rules, 4 and then various mandatory
disclosure regimes are discussed to show the range of possibilities available
to Kentucky if it elects to adopt such a scheme. 5 This Note also considers
whether the rules adopted by other states should be modified or updated to
better coincide with today's legal atmosphere. 6 Finally, in Part VI the
current safeguards employed in Kentucky and potential additional
protective measures are evaluated. 7
II. WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?
America's legal system is plagued by three major problems with regard
to malpractice insurance. First, the number of malpractice claims filed
against attorneys has increased sharply over the past decade as the practice
areas subject to such claims become increasingly diversified. 8 Second, the
percentage of attorneys without coverage has remained static. '" Third, and
not unexpected given the first two problems, is the greater probability that
an attorney who commits malpractice will be uninsured.2 ' Kentucky is not
without these problems and its attorneys are experiencing the effects of this
changing legal environment.2 '
A. Attorneys are Increasingly Susceptible to Malpractice Claims
The number of malpractice claims filed against attorneys in the past
several years has skyrocketed. In today's legal society, lawyers are more
12 See infra notes 18-44 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 45-138 and accompanying text.
'4 See infra notes 77-138 and accompanying text.
'5 See infra notes 116-133 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
'7 See infra notes 139-152 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
'9 See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 22-44 and accompanying text.
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apt to be sued, which means "that a new attorney is likely to face three
claims before finishing his or her career., 22 A 1999 American Bar
Association ("ABA") study revealed that the number of claims filed against
attorneys increased by nearly 18,000 since 1995, an increase of over
90%.23
While Kentucky has not kept pace with the national trend, the state has
still witnessed a rising number of malpractice claims. Lawyer's Mutual
Insurance Company of Kentucky 24 ("LMICK") estimates that, from 1995
to 2002, the number of claims against its insured attorneys has increased
nearly 150%.25 Clearly, the number of malpractice claims is rising, but the
problem is even worse than one might imagine: these studies only include
claims filed against insured attorneys. 6
Not only is the sheer number of claims increasing, but the categories
of claims are becoming more diverse. In 1999, the practice areas most
susceptible to malpractice claims were personal injury-plaintiff, real estate,
and family law.27 Over the past decade, personal injury-plaintiff and real
estate have been the most targeted practice areas for potential malpractice
claims.28 After examining this data, one might be tempted to assume that
22 Mallen, supra note 1, at 10.
23 ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROF'L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 1996-1999,5 (2001) [hereinafter PROFILES] (indicating that
the total number of claims rose from 19,158 in 1995 to 36,844 in 1999, an increase
of 92.3%).
24 LMICK currently occupies approximately 40% of the legal malpractice
insurance market for attorneys in private practice in the state of Kentucky.
Interview with Asa "Pete" Gullett, Chief Executive Officer, Lawyers' Mutual
Insurance Company of Kentucky, in Louisville, Ky. (Dec. 29, 2003).
25 Id. This includes the number of attorney-reported incidents, client-reporting
claims, and suits filed against insured attorneys. In 1995 there were 148 claims
against LMICK insureds; in 2002 there were 168 claims, a 13.5% increase. Id.
26 See PROFILES, supra note 23, at 4; Interview with Asa "Pete" Gullett, supra
note 24.
27 PROFILES, supra note 23, at 5. According to LMICK, the majority of claims
filed against its attorneys come from cases involving real estate. See Interview with
Asa "Pete" Gullett, supra note 24. Real estate comprised approximately 29% of all
claims filed against LMICK insured attorneys in 2002. Plaintiff personal injury was
second with 20% and bankruptcy cases was third with 18%. Id.
28 See PROFILES, supra note 23, at 5-7. Personal injury-plaintiff and real estate,
combined, comprised nearly 36% of all malpractice claims in 1995, and 41.57% in
1999. Family law comprised 9.13% of all claims in 1995, surpassed only by
business transaction/commercial Law, which totaled 10.66%. By 1999, family law
had increased by 1% to pass all other categories, ranking as the third most likely
area of practice to attract a malpractice claim. Id.
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attorneys not practicing in one of these "traditional" areas would not be as
susceptible to a malpractice claim. However, given the recent developments
in the post-Enron legal environment and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, nothing could be further from the truth.29
The scope of malpractice claims has expanded recently to encompass
areas of practice that were once considered "protected." Now, even in-
house corporate counsel are subject to new liability arising from more
expansive responsibilities.30 One commentator speculates that "[w]ith
respect to corporate lawyers' civil liability. . . more complaints alleging
negligent misrepresentation will be filed against attorneys who represent
corporations, because they are easier to bring against lawyers than
securities fraud lawsuits.' In addition to the expanding liability of
corporate counsel, ERISA lawyers may be subject to "a new level of
liability."32 With such a changing trend, it seems every attorney, from a solo
practitioner handling a real estate closing to a partner in a large firm closing
a complicated securities transaction, is susceptible to a malpractice suit.
B. Many Attorneys are Still "Going Bare "33
Despite the skyrocketing number of malpractice claims, many attorneys
still neglect to insure themselves.3 4 In 1987, an ABA official estimated that
"'[p]robably 20 to 45 percent of the lawyers in a given jurisdiction in
private practice are without insurance.' , Today, the consensus among
experts is that approximately "one third or more of American lawyers in
private practice are uninsured."36 Kentucky's percentage is no better; of the
29 See Joan C. Rogers, Conference Report: Legal Malpractice and Risk
Management, 19 LAW. Manual on Prof. Conduct Current Reports 176 (2003).
30 See id. at 176. Not only are corporate lawyers subject to potential malpractice
claims, but due to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its requirement of up-
the-ladder reporting, in-house counsel is now liable for a host of possible SEC
violations. Id.
" Id. at 178.
32 Id. at 178-79 (citing Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney,
Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2000)).
33 See Debra Cassens Moss, Going Bare: Practicing Without Malpractice
Insurance, 73 A.B.A. J. 82 (1987).
34 See id.
35 Id. at 82 (quoting Duke Nordlinger Stem, a member of the A.B.A.'s Standing
Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability).
36 Towery, supra note 6, at 22.
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current 14,212 members of the Kentucky Bar Association,37 it is estimated
that nearly 30% are uninsured.38
There are several reasons why so many attorneys decide to remain
uninsured. As one commentator suggests:
Attorneys generally "go bare" for four reasons. First, they do not believe
that the nature of their practice is such that they will face a malpractice
claim. Second, they are willing to accept the risk. Third, they do not have
the money to pay the insurance premiums. Finally, they do not want to
compensate the victim of malpractice.
39
Bruce Davis, Executive Director of the Kentucky Bar Association,
speculates that the main reasons Kentucky practitioners go uninsured are:
(1) the cost of insurance premiums; (2) due to past malpractice claims,
some attorneys may be uninsurable; (3) the notion that a lawyer with only
minimal resources will have nothing to lose if sued; and (4) many lawyers
are willing to assume the risks of uninsured practice.40 Whatever the reason,
the fact remains that many Kentucky practitioners susceptible to malprac-
tice claims remain uninsured.
C. Uninsured Attorneys: The "Client's Tough Luck?"
41
The static number of uninsured attorneys exacerbates the problem
created by the increasing number and types of malpractice claims, and
creates another problem: clients do bring malpractice claims against
uninsured attorneys and are often deprived of their legal remedy when they
" E-mail from Bruce Davis, Executive Director, Kentucky Bar Association, to
Nicholas A. Marsh (Nov. 6, 2003, 12:00 pm EST) (on file with author). The
number of Kentucky Bar Association members is accurate as ofNovember 1, 2003.
See id.
" Interview with Bruce Davis, Executive Director, Kentucky Bar Association,
in Frankfort, Ky. (Sept. 24, 2003). As a matter of pure speculation, Mr. Davis
approximates that nearly 30% of attorneys in Kentucky, may be practicing
uninsured. See id.; see also E-mail from Bruce Davis, supra note 37. Of the 14,212
K.B.A. members, only 2792 reported having some form of liability coverage in the
2003-04 annual dues statement. Id. Although this evidence is not conclusive, the
relatively low number of attorneys reporting insurance coverage is telling.
" Cunitz, supra note 3, at 647.
'o Interview with Bruce Davis, supra note 38.
" Towery, supra note 6, at 22.
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cannot recover.4 2 Unfortunately for the client, uninsured attorneys who
commit malpractice and are unable to satisfy malpractice judgments leave
their clients without a remedy.43 These attorneys through their negligence
deprive their clients of the judicial remedy they originally sought. Then, by
failing to compensate the client for their negligence, they foreclose the
possibility of any possible remedy for the unlucky client. As one commen-
tator explained, "that's the client's tough luck.
' 44
HI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Legal scholars, judges, lawyers, and bar officials are well aware of the
injustice of leaving clients with no remedy when their uninsured attorney
commits malpractice. 4' As a result, two possible solutions to the problem
have emerged. One solution mandates that every practicing attorney carry
a minimum amount of malpractice insurance coverage.46 This solution is
illustrated by the Oregon model of mandatory coverage. 47 The second
possible solution is mandatory disclosure. Several states have adopted
various disclosure systems.48 Generally, mandatory disclosure requires
uninsured attorneys to disclose their lack of malpractice insurance to their
42 See id. ("Many clients... presume that all lawyers are required to carry
malpractice insurance .... [They] often discover the fallacy of that assumption for
the first time when they attempt to sue their uninsured lawyers.").
43 See Robert I. Johnston & Kathryn L. Simpson, 0 Brothers, 0 Sisters, Art
Thou Insured?, PA. LAW., May-June 2002, at 32.
44 Towery, supra note 6, at 22. Towery comments that in most jurisdictions
where proof of insurance is not required, the client bears the consequences of an
attorney's negligence. See id. One of the main criticisms of this argument is the
lack of supporting data. Id. at 23. Towery argues, however, that no study is needed.
He claims that attorneys without insurance are just as likely, if not more so, to
commit malpractice as those with insurance. He also maintains that the presence
of insurance is often the threshold question in determining the merit of bringing a
malpractice claim against an attorney. Therefore, many potential malpractice claims
are dropped for lack of insurance. See id.; see also Johnston & Simpson, supra
note 43, at 32 (noting that clients often suffer a "double injury" caused by an
uninsured attorney who commits malpractice).
"5 See, e.g., Johnston & Simpson, supra note 43, at 28 (noting instances in
which state supreme courts, state bar associations, and the A.B.A. House of
Delegates have considered or adopted mandating insurance provisions).
46 OR. REV. STAT. § 9.080(2) (2001).
47 Id.
41 See Cunitz, supra note 3, at 663-65.
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clients.49 The purpose of such a rule is to protect clients by providing them
with the information necessary to balance the risks of hiring an uninsured
attorney. The question becomes: is one of these solutions right for
Kentucky?
A. Mandatory Coverage
The mandatory coverage rule was the first adopted to address the
problem of uninsured attorneys who commit malpractice. The rule requires
that all attorneys in the state, not otherwise excepted, carry a minimum
amount of professional liability insurance coverage. Oregon is the only
state so far that has adopted this rule."
1. The Oregon Model
In 1977, Oregon adopted a mandatory malpractice insurance program.52
The statute gave authority to the state bar's board of governors "to require
all active members of the state bar engaged in the private practice of law
whose principal offices are in Oregon to carry professional liability
insurance."53 Pursuant to this authority, "[t]he Oregon State Bar Board of
Governors created the Professional Liability Fund. . . , [which] provides
coverage of $300,000 per claim, [and] $300,000 aggregate to all attorneys
engaged in the private practice of law in Oregon."54 Since the program's
inception, it has been mandatory that every practicing Oregon attorney
receive insurance from the Professional Liability Fund.5
Although initially met by heavy criticism, the mandatory coverage
scheme has generally been accepted by the members of the Oregon Bar. 6
49 See id. at 663.
50 See Memorandum from Lynda C. Shely, Chair, ABA Standing Committee on
Client Protection, to Chairs of ABA entities and other interested parties (July 16,
2002), http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/annual02/councilagendatabl 0.doc (calling
the lack of malpractice insurance a "material fact that may bear upon a client's
decision to hire a lawyer").
' John P. Bailey, Professional Liability Insurance, W. VA. LAW., Oct. 2003,
at 4.
52 Cunitz, supra note 3, at 651.
13 OR. REV. STAT. § 9.080(2)(a) (2001).54 Oregon State Bar, Professional Liability Fund, http://www.osbar.org/plf/plf.
html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003) (on file with author).
" See id. There are exceptions for certain types of attorneys. Corporate counsel,
government lawyers, law professors, and some others are not required to partici-
pate. Id.
56 See id. (noting that, of those who have used the PLF's services and filled out
evaluation forms, 99% were satisfied and 87% were "very satisfied").
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However, Oregon is currently the only state that requires its attorneys to
carry insurance." The Illinois State Bar Association recently considered
proposing a similar rule, but when the proposal went before the Illinois
Supreme Court, mandatory coverage was rejected in favor of a less
extensive system of mandatory disclosure.5"
When mandatory coverage is proposed, it is often met with criticism. 9
For example, the Pennsylvania Bar concluded that Oregon's mandatory
insurance requirement would not be feasible,' and a survey on the subject
by the Montana Bar received a mixed response, including strong opposition
from some attorneys."
2. Why Mandatory Coverage Is Not the Solution for Kentucky
A proposal for mandatory insurance coverage would likely face
criticism and strong opposition in Kentucky. However, the strongest
opponent may not be the bar, but rather Kentucky's constitution. In
McGuffey v. Hall, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the validity of
a statute that required doctors practicing within the state to carry malprac-
7 Bailey, supra note 51, at 4.
58 See Molly McDonough, Push for Mandatory Coverage: Illinois Wants to
Make Malpractice Insurance the Law, A.B.A. J. E-REP., Jan. 11,2002, at I (noting
that the Illinois Bar Association was considering sending a proposed rule to the
Illinois Supreme Court that would require all private lawyers in the state to comply
with a system comparable to Oregon's); see also Stephen Anderson, New Rule
Would Seek Disclosure of Lack of Liability Insurance, BAR NEWS (Ill. State Bar
Ass'n), Sept. 2003, http://www.isba.org/Association/039-16a.htm (discussing the
proposed rule requiring mandatory disclosure, not mandatory coverage).
'9 Cunitz, supra note 3, at 653-57. Cunitz argues that there are six major
criticisms of mandatory coverage. They include (1) the lack of proof that uninsured
attorneys are problematic, id. at 653-54; (2) the fact that insurance coverage does
not necessarily mean the client will be protected, id. at 654-55; (3) the coercive
nature of making insurance coverage mandatory, id. at 655; (4) the cost of
coverage, id. at 655-56; (5) the discriminatory nature of compulsory coverage, id.
at 656; and (6) the trickle-down effect of coverage costs, id. at 656-57. Cunitz also
argues that mandatory coverage will lead to insurance companies controlling the
legal field. She hypothesizes that attorneys will become indifferent in the way they
practice law and that mandatory coverage will lead to further specialization in the
legal environment. Id.
o See Johnston & Simpson, supra note 43, at 30.
61 See Jill Sundby, What Montana Lawyers Think About Mandatory Malprac-
tice Insurance: Your Answers to State Bar Survey, MONT. LAW., Aug. 2001, at
24-37.
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tice insurance.62 The statute created a liability fund, the Kentucky Patients'
Compensation Fund, that was similar in form and function to the Profes-
sional Liability Fund instituted in Oregon.63 Every non-exempt physician
and hospital in Kentucky was required to be a member of the fund and
carry a minimum coverage of $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000
aggregate liability insurance.' 4 The purpose of the statute was to "promote
the health and general welfare of the general citizenry through adopting
reforms in medical malpractice claims, establishing the Fund so as to
increase the availability and lower the cost of medical malpractice
insurance, and assuring that medical malpractice judgments and settlements
will be satisfied. 65
The court found that the statutory scheme was flawed because there
was not "any reasonable relationship to the problem stated ... or to any
other... threatened problem shown to exist."' The court refused to accept
the Commonwealth's argument that the statute was a valid exercise of its
police power.67 It said the Commonwealth failed to show that mandated
insurance would increase the availability of or reduce the cost of medical
malpractice insurance. 68 Relying on Section 1(5) of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion, which protects "the right of acquiring and protecting property,"'69 the
court held that "the provision for compulsory malpractice insurance has not
been shown to be justified as an exercise of the police power, in the
absence of which any interference with the natural right of any individual
or group to pursue a legitimate business or profession is a violation of [the
state constitution]. ''7°
Any proposal of mandatory malpractice insurance for lawyers would
likely be met with the same constitutional challenges as those set out in
McGuffey. Supporters of mandatory coverage argue that the law requires
mandatory insurance in other circumstances, such as compulsory automo-
bile insurance, and that attorneys should not receive special treatment.7'
62 McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1977).
63 Id. at 408.
64id.
65 Id. at 412.
66 id.
67 1d. at 412-13.
68 Id. at 414.
69 KY. CONST. of 1891 § 1.70 McGuffey, 557 S.W.2d at 414.
7" See id. (recognizing this argument and rejecting it); Towery, supra note 6, at
[VOL. 92
2003-2004] INSURANCE COVERAGE AND DISCLOSURE RULES
The court considered the former argument in McGuffey v. Hall and
concluded that compulsory automobile insurance was obviously necessary
to protect other motorists, whereas no statistics supported the need for
protecting patients from unsatisfied medical malpractice claims.72 Yet,
McGuffey left room for the state to impose a mandatory coverage require-
ment if the need was statistically documented.73 That is, if proponents offer
sufficient statistics or demonstrate a nexus between the government's need
to protect attorneys' clients and a compulsory insurance scheme, the rule
might survive constitutional scrutiny. But, without such proof, the rule will
have to overcome the constitutional hurdle set forth in McGuffey.
One factor distinguishes a proposed coverage rule from the statute in
McGuffey: a mandatory coverage scheme for attorneys would be created by
judicial decision, not legislative action. The Kentucky Supreme Court could
rely upon the inherent power doctrine, prescribing that courts have the
"exclusive responsibility within this state for the structure and administra-
tion of the lawyer discipline ... system and ... [courts have] inherent
power to maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct and to
dispose of individual cases of lawyer discipline."74 The Kentucky Supreme
Court has stated that the power "to prescribe a code of ethics and to
establish practice and procedure for disciplining, suspending and disbarring
attorneys.. . is inherently a judicial function."75 Thus, the inherent power
doctrine may render the McGuffey analysis moot in a constitutional
challenge to the promulgation of a mandatory coverage rule. But, even
assuming that mandatory coverage passed constitutional muster, it may
72 McGuffey, 557 S.W.2d at 414.
73 Id.
74 MODELRULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, pmbl. (1993). See
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 (2000)
(stating that "[t]he highest courts in most states have ruled as a matter of state
constitutional law that their power to regulate lawyers is inherent in the judicial
function").
" Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 538 S.W.2d 39, 41-42 (Ky. 1976); see also
Ratterman v. Stapleton, 371 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Ky. 1963) ("The right to prescribe
such rules as necessary to... regulate... attorneys... is a right of self-preserva-
tion."); In re Rudd, 221 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Ky. 1949) (noting that the power to
disbar attorneys is an inherent power of the court); Commonwealth ex rel.
Buckingham v. Ward, 103 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1937) (stating that the right of the
court to establish rules of practice and procedure for disciplining attorneys has been
upheld previously); Commonwealth ex rel. Ward v. Harrington, 98 S.W.2d 53, 58
(Ky. 1936) (holding that courts, independent of any legislation, have the power to
make rules necessary for their functioning).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ultimately lack support from the state bar."6 Unfortunately, there are no
published studies to indicate exactly what support or opposition a proposed
rule would meet in Kentucky.
B. Mandatory Disclosure
Several states have avoided the resistance associated with mandatory
coverage schemes while still protecting the public from malpractice
committed by uninsured attorneys by requiring non-exempt, uninsured
attorneys to disclose their uninsured status. Five states currently have some
variation of this requirement for uninsured attorneys.77 As many as seven
other states have considered similar rules within the past year.78
1. Proposed ABA Model Rule
The ABA Standing Committee on Client Protection voted in 2002 to
recommend to the ABA House of Delegates "that Rule 1.4 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct be amended to provide for the
disclosure of the lack of malpractice insurance."79 The relevant provisions
of the proposed rule stated:
(c) A lawyer shall inform new and existing clients, in writing, if the
lawyer does not have malpractice insurance. A lawyer shall inform
the client, in writing, any time the lawyer's malpractice insurance is
terminated. A lawyer shall maintain a record of these disclosures for
five years from the conclusion of the client's representation.
76 See interview with Bruce Davis, supra note 38.
77 See ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4; N.H. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.17; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § DR 1-104 (Anderson Supp. 2002);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-18 app., Rule 1.4 (Michie Supp. 2003); VA. R. CT. 6 §
4, para. 18.
71 See Lawyer Malpractice Insurance Coverage and Disclosure of Coverage,
Wyo. LAW., Feb. 2003, at 41-42 (noting that Alabama, Colorado, Illinois,
Missouri, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania all have some sort of rule pending either at
the bar association or supreme court level); Mandatory Malpractice Insurance to
be Debated Feb. 14, RES GESTAE, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 7 (noting that the Indiana
State Bar Association Professional Legal Education, Admissions, & Development
Section was to hold public debates regarding the feasibility of either a mandatory
coverage or mandatory disclosure rule).
79Memorandum from Lynda C. Shely, supra note 50.
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(d) The requirements in (c) do not apply to full-time members of the
judiciary, or full-time, in-house counsel or government lawyers when
representing the entity by whom they are employed. 0
When the committee met in October 2002, however, it decided not to
present the proposed rule for adoption because comments from other ABA
committees did not produce adequate support."' It should be noted that the
proposal may still be submitted for adoption at a later date. According to
Committee Chairperson Linda Shely, the committee is merely "regroup-
ing," and they "have no specific game plan. ' 2 Given the activities of state
supreme courts, state bar associations, and the ABA, the prevailing trend
favors mandating disclosure. 3
2. Justifications for Mandatory Disclosure
If the Kentucky Supreme Court considers adopting a disclosure
requirement, the justifications or theoretical foundations for such a rule will
be important.8 4 An emerging trend in modem legal society is an insistence
80 ABA STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION, PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
RULE 1.4 OF THE ABAMODEL RULES OFPROFESSIONAL CONDUCTTO PROVIDE FOR
THE DISCLOSURE OF LACK OF PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE, http://www.
abanet.org/adminlaw/annual02/councilagendadatab 10.doc (June 5, 2002).
"' Attributed to Linda C. Shely, Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on
Client Protection in James Podgers, Time-Out Call: Sponsor Holds off on Proposal
Regarding Malpractice Insurance Disclosures, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2003, at 66.
82 Id. (quoting Lynda C. Shely, Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Client
Protection).
83 See Marvin J. Rudnitsky, Witnessing 'Glacial'Change, PA. LAW., Sept.-Oct.
2002, at 48 (noting that in his experience as a member of the House of Delegates,
Rudnitsky noticed that "changes in the ethical rules come slowly but inexorably").
" Perhaps the best way to explore the justifications for mandatory disclosure
is by comparison to other areas of the law. The most evident area is compulsory
automobile insurance. The state's primary reason for requiring that all drivers be
insured is to "demonstrate that [drivers] have the ability to protect the public if
anyone is injured by [their] negligence in [their] use of that license." Towery, supra
note 6, at 22. Drivers want the assurance of knowing that they can recover in the
event another driver causes an accident resulting in injury. However, it is not
difficult to recognize the impracticability of requiring that everyone on the high-
way disclose whether they are insured so others can make a choice as to whether
or not they want to share the road with them. Recognizing this impracticability, and
the importance that individuals place upon being able to recover, states have
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on informed client consent.85 The new Model Rules define informed
consent as "the agreement to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer
has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material
risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of
conduct., 86 A mandatory disclosure rule applying this principle would
ensure a client's ability to give informed consent when hiring an attorney.
Underlying the informed consent principle is a fundamental justifica-
tion for a disclosure rule based on the duty of communication owed to a
client.87 The duty of communication announced in the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct 88 stems from common law principles of agency and
common law fiduciary duties owed to clients.89 A disclosure rule is best
explained by examining the duty of communication in these two contexts.
adopted compulsory insurance schemes for licensed drivers so disclosure is not
necessary.
Similarly, if given the choice, a client would choose an attorney from whom he
or she could recover if the attorney made a mistake resulting in injury to the client.
This informed choice is analogous to the consumer who buys a product with a
warranty so he is protected in the event of a defect. Unfortunately, many clients
may never consider the fact that their attorney might commit malpractice; many
people who hire counsel are unaware that attorneys are not required to carry
malpractice insurance. Id. Therefore, many potential clients inadvertently make
uninformed decisions. Given that the formation of the attorney-client relationship
is less arbitrary than the random accidents that occur on the highways, the same
level of protection may not be needed. McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401, 414
(Ky. 1977) (noting that "the uninsured motorist is a known and recognized public
menace who should have been outlawed long ago"). In the case of attorneys and
their clients, both current and potential disclosure is much more practical and
feasible. Even though the means vary slightly, the goal remains the same. The
unknowing client should be protected by being given the information he would
want if he knew to ask for it.
85 See ABA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT xiii (2000).86 Id. at 7.
87 See Podgers, supra note 81, at 66 (quoting Linda C. Shely, Chair of the ABA
Standing Committee on Client Protection as stating that the proposed rule is "about
communicating material information to clients").
88 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2003).
89 LAW. ABA/BNA MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT § 31:502 (Jun. 25, 1997).
The link between disclosure rules and the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client
relationship is a recurring theme throughout this Note. Agency principles are relied
upon for supporting information but are not at the forefront of discussion.
Exploration of this topic in terms of an attorney's fiduciary duty was suggested by
Professor Eugene Gaetke, University of Kentucky College of Law.
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a. Duty of Communication in Terms ofAgency Principles
The Restatement (Second) ofAgency § 381 details the duty of an agent
to give information to his principal:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable
efforts to give his principal information which is relevant to affairs
entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the principal would
desire to have and which can be communicated without violating a
superior duty to a third person.
90
Kentucky courts have long recognized that an attorney has essentially the
same responsibilities as an agent. 9' More recently, however, Kentucky's
courts have noted that an attorney's duties are not truly the same as that of
an agent; something more is required of an attorney. 92 The Kentucky Court
of Appeals held:
[T]he attorney is vested with powers superior to those of any ordinary
agent because of the attorney's quasi-judicial status as an officer of the
court; thus the attorney is responsible for the administration ofjustice in
the public interest, a higher duty than any ordinary agent owes his
principal.93
The thrust of this argument is that the attorney, as the agent, owes the
client, as the principal, the utmost duty to disclose information the client
would consider important. The Restatement requires that the agent
communicate any information to the principal that the principal would
desire to have,94 even if "not specifically instructed to do so."95 Therefore,
mandatory disclosure is merely a codification of an existing duty the
attorney-agent owes to the client.
b. Duty of Communication in Terms of Fiduciary Relationship
The second basis for the duty of communication arises from the
fiduciary relationship between attorneys and their clients. A fiduciary
9' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958).
"' See Asher v. Beckner, 41 S.W. 35, 47 (Ky. 1897).
92 Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
93 id.
9' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958).
95Id. at cmt. a.
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relationship is one "in which the one person is under a duty to act for the
benefit of the other on matters within the scope of the relationship."96 The
relationship between an attorney and client has traditionally been one in
which fiduciary duties are recognized.97 "Lawyers are the special purpose
fiduciary agents of their clients, and are accordingly entrusted by their
principal-clients with sensitive tasks that the clients cannot readily
undertake for themselves and cannot realistically supervise on an ongoing
basis."98 Kentucky courts have long recognized that "the public has a right
to expect from his lawyer fair dealing, fidelity and [a] high degree of
competency."99 In Daugherty v. Runner,'00 the court noted that the
fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship imposes on the attorney
"the duty to exercise in all his relationships with this client-principal the
most scrupulous honor, good faith and fidelity to his client's interest."' 0 '
Previously, the Kentucky Court of Appeals (the highest court in the state
at the time), noted the fiduciary nature of the relationship between attorneys
and their clients stating:
The measure of good faith required of an attorney in dealing with his
clients is far higher than that exacted in the ordinary business transaction.
The relationship is one of trust and confidence, and it is the duty of the
courts to preserve it upon a high plane of moral responsibility for the
protection of the public .... [Good faith and fair dealing] are essential
elements in his contacts with his clients.1
0 2
Clearly, Kentucky attorneys owe their clients the duties of utmost good
faith and loyalty. One way to ensure that attorneys fulfill these duties is to
impose upon them the duty to communicate with their clients.'0 3 Conse-
quently, the arguments supporting mandatory disclosure rest heavily on the
recognition of the duty of communication and fiduciary obligations.'0 4
96 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (7th ed. 1999).
9' See id.
91 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, 1 THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 4.7 (3d ed. Supp. 2003).
99 Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Cowden, 727 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Ky. 1987).
"oo Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
'o' Id. at 16.
102 In re Gilbert, 118 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Ky. 1938).
103 See KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130.
04 Linda C. Shely, Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Client Protection,
has noted that in the absence of mandating insurance coverage, "'the best we could
do would be to require that lawyers inform clients so they could make an informed
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c. How Does Kentucky Deal with the Duty of Communication?
In substance, Kentucky's rule dealing with client communication is
comparable to the ABA's Model Rule. The Kentucky rule emphasizes the
importance of communication and the significance of explaining informa-
tion to a client so the client can make an informed decision." 5 In its
commentary, the Kentucky Supreme Court noted the importance of
providing the client with "sufficient information to participate intelligently
in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means
by which they are to be pursued."' 6 While Kentucky places a premium on
attorney-client communication, this raises the question of whether the
Kentucky Supreme Court should adopt a rule of mandatory disclosure.
Ultimately, the court's decision will turn on whether an attorney's lack of
malpractice insurance is information necessary to the client's decision
regarding representation. 7
decision' about whom to hire to represent them." Podgers, supra note 81, at 66
(quoting Linda C. Shely, Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Client
Protection). Bruce Davis agreed, stating that disclosing the lack of malpractice
insurance by attorneys would be another piece of information that potential clients
could utilize in making a decision to hire an attorney. Interview with Bruce Davis,
supra note 38. The comments to the proposed amendment to Rule 1.4 noted that
"[tihe absence of professional liability insurance is a material fact that may bear
upon a client's decision to hire a lawyer." See ABA Standing Comm. on Client
Protection, supra note 80, at cmt. 8. Finally, in two out of the four jurisdictions that
have adopted a mandatory disclosure rule, the duty is regarded as an extension of
the attorney's duty of communication. Alaska and South Dakota both inserted the
disclosure requirements into their version of ABA Model Rule 1.4 dealing with
attorney-client communication. See ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 ; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 16-18 app., R. 1.4 (Michie Supp. 2003).
05 See KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130(b).
'6d. R. 3.130 cmt. 1.
107 This begs the question: what are the client's objectives in hiring an attorney
and bringing suit? One can hardly doubt that legal recourse is an important
objective of a client who has been harmed. Obviously, injured people hope to be
compensated by bringing suit. Therefore, the probability of recovery is important
to the client. Potential clients may find it important to know that if their attorney
commits malpractice, they will face the possibility of not being compensated for
their injury by the tortfeasor or the negligent attorney.
This argument works well in the area of torts, where alternative sources of
recovery may be needed, but it assumes a slightly different character in other areas,
such as real estate, adoption, and estate planning. In these specialty areas, the
objective of representation may not be to recover from a third party, but rather to
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3. Criticisms of Mandatory Disclosure and Counter-Arguments
One of the primary arguments against mandatory disclosure is that it
stigmatizes uninsured attorneys."08 Critics argue that this stigma is
especially problematic for attorneys operating on limited budgets who may
be forced out of their practice area and the legal field altogether if they
were required to choose between acquiring insurance or bearing a negative
stigma. 9 However, a single malpractice claim could put a small practitio-
ner operating on a limited budget out of business as well. Given the high
likelihood that an attorney will incur a malpractice claim during his
career, 110 practicing without insurance is counter-intuitive. Even critics
concede that "having malpractice insurance is almost always better than not
having it.""'
Another viable counter-argument is that to allow the attorney to
prioritize his own interests violates the principles of agency and fiduciary
obligations as set out above. 1 2 An attorney-agent may find that he or she
can save on premiums, regardless of the potential detriment to the client in
the event the attorney commits malpractice. But the attorney's actions may
constitute a violation of other agency principles. The Restatement provides
that an agent with interests adverse to his principal can still be an agent, but
a breach of duty occurs when he does so "without revealing the existence
and extent of such adverse interests."' 3 Therefore, the attorney-agent
should disclose to the client that, instead of acting pursuant to the client's
obtain quality, professional legal services. Instead of becoming the secondary
source of recovery in such cases, the attorney is the primary source of recovery
because his actions are the original tort. The core argument would be that
disclosure gives potential clients information to make an informed judgment about
the fiscal responsibility of the attorney. Commentators have noted that "it is
difficult to imagine a persuasive argument in favor of failing to provide financial
responsibility in the event we make a mistake that injures our client." Johnston &
Simpson, supra note 43, at 32. Regardless of the client's representational objective,
the client relies on the attorney's duty to adhere to the required standard of care. If
this is not done, a client expects remuneration for the mistakes that constitute
malpractice.
"'08 See Edward C. Mendrzycki, Should Disclosure ofMalpractice Insurance be
Mandatory?, GP SOLO, Apr.-May 2003, at 37, 41.
9 See id.
1' See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
... Mendrzycki, supra note 108, at 37.
"' See supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text for discussion of agency
principles and fiduciary obligations.
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 23 (1958).
[VOL. 92
2003-2004] INSURANCE COVERAGE AND DISCLOSURE RULES
interests, he or she is acting in his or her own financial interest by not main-
taining malpractice insurance.
The agency counter-argument can also be couched in terms of the
fiduciary duty the attorney owes the client. It is the duty of the attorney "to
represent the client with undivided loyalty ... [and] unflinching fidelity."'"
4
Therefore, if the attorney's loyalty to the client is to be undivided, his own
financial well-being cannot be the motivating force in decisions regarding
representation of clients.
Most critics fail to recognize that a disclosure requirement may already
exist, even though it is unstated. Given the agency principles, fiduciary
obligations, and duties of communication set out above," 5 attorneys may
already have a duty to disclose their lack of insurance to clients despite the
absence of a formal requirement. However, a formal rule would clarify
attorneys' obligations, protect the client through communication, and give
attorneys freedom to choose whether to buy malpractice insurance.
4. Different Types of Plans
If the Kentucky Supreme Court decided to adopt a mandatory
disclosure scheme, what type of scheme should it choose? Though only five
states have adopted mandatory disclosure rules, each is unique.
a. Virginia
Of the five states with disclosure rules, the Virginia model has been
considered by some to be the "simplest and least intrusive.""' 6 Virginia
focuses on dissemination of information to the public about the financial
responsibility of attorneys practicing within the state.' Specifically, the
Virginia rule requires that every active member of the state bar certify
annually to the bar whether or not they carry professional liability
insurance, and whether they are in private practice or serve the public." 8 In
addition to disclosure, the Virginia Bar Association went further, publish-
'" 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 14.1
(5th ed. 2000).
115 See supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
116 Johnston & Simpson, supra note 43, at 31 (comparing the disciplinary rules
of Virginia, Ohio, Alaska, and South Dakota and the impact each has on the
number of uninsured attorneys).
"1 VA. R. CT. 6 § 4, para. 18.
"
8 Id. The Virginia statute also requires attorneys to disclose to the state bar any
unsatisfied judgments against them for malpractice. Id.
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ing the disclosed information on its website." 9 Unlike other state disclosure
rules, which offer exemption from disclosure to certain attorneys who are
not in private practice, the Virginia Rule applies to all active members
regardless of practice area.1
2 1
b. Alaska
The Alaska rule builds directly on the traditional rule of professional
conduct regarding communication between attorney and client.12' The rule
requires that the attorney inform existing clients in writing if the lawyer
does not carry coverage with limits of at least $100,000 per claim and
$300,000 per year in the aggregate. 2 2 The rule does not apply to lawyers
in government practice or those employed as in-house counsel. 
3
c. Ohio and New Hampshire
The Ohio statute and the New Hampshire rule are essentially the same
as the Alaska rule. They require attorneys to inform clients whether they
carry the requisite $100,000/$300,000 coverage, if their coverage is less
than the mandatory amount, or if it has been terminated. 124 However, Ohio
and New Hampshire are more explicit than Alaska in that they require that
disclosure be made at or subsequent to the time of engagement.2 5 Like
Alaska, Ohio and New Hampshire also provide an exemption for govern-
ment attorneys'2 6 and in-house counsel.2 7 Ohio and New Hampshire are
" James Towery, Should Disclosure ofMalpractice Insurance Be Mandatory?,
GP SOLO, Apr.-May 2003, at 36,38 (noting that the website had more than 25,000
hits in the first week after the disclosure information was posted).
120 VA. R. CT. 6 § 4, para. 18.
121 ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4.
122 id.
23 Id. cmt.
124 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § DR 1- 104 (West 2002); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.17. The Ohio rule and the New Hampshire rule are functionally
identical except for a transitional period which was provided in the New Hampshire
rule. See N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.17(d).
25 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § DR 1-104; N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.17.
126 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § DR 1-1 04(C)(1); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1. 17(c)(1).
127 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § DR 1-1 04(C)(2); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.17(c)(2).
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also more detailed than Alaska in their proof of disclosure, requiring that
the notice to be signed by the client.'
21
d. South Dakota
The most intrusive disclosure scheme was adopted by South Dakota.
The South Dakota statute requires lawyers to place on their letterhead a
statement disclosing that they do not carry the minimum $100,000 of
professional liability insurance. 129 The disclosure language must "be in
black ink with type no smaller than the type used for showing the individual
lawyer's names." "3 Unlike the one-time disclosure in Alaska and Ohio,
South Dakota requires that the disclosure be a component of "every written
communication with a client."' 31 It also provides that the disclosures shall
be in every written or media advertisement by the attorney. 132 Like Alaska
and Ohio, though, this rule also provides an exemption for government
lawyers or full-time in-house counsel.
3
5. Pitfalls of Current Disclosure Plans-Is the Proposed Rule Sound?
The most obvious flaw in the various mandatory disclosure regimes is
visible in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.'34 Every state's disclosure
rule, except Virginia's, provides an exemption for in-house corporate
counsel. 135 Now that claims are being filed against a broader array of
practice areas, including in-house corporate counsel, these exemptions may
hinder the objective of informing the client. A generic rule without
exceptions may be best to ensure that, as the law evolves, client protection
evolves as well.
Two other issues not addressed by these rules are the adequacy of the
insurance carrier itself and the possibility of a diminishing limits policy.'36
128 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § DR 1-104(A)-(B); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.17(b). Contrast these with Alaska Rule 1.4(c), which merely
requires that the attorney keep a record of the disclosure for six years after
representation has been terminated. ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4.
129 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-18 app., R. 1.4 (Michie Supp. 2003).
130 Id. R. 7.5.
131Id. R. 1.4(d).
'1
2 Id. R. 7.2(k)(1).
'"' Id. R. 1.4(e).
134 See supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text.
135 See Rogers, supra note 29, at 176.
136 Towery, supra note 119, at 39. This type of policy allows defense expenses
incurred to reduce the amount of liability coverage.
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First, the reputation of the insurance carrier may be valuable to a potential
client. If the carrier has a reputation of not paying claims, it may have some
bearing on whether the attorney's coverage will protect the client. None of
the rules set out above provide for approval of the carrier by the bar
association or disclosure of the carrier's identity. Second, none of the rules
prohibit diminishing limits policies, an arrangement where defense
expenses incurred by the insurer decreases the amount of liability coverage.
These policies are problematic because, as defense expenses are incurred,
the coverage may fall below the state's required levels.'37 The existence of
such policies seems to make the establishment of minimum coverage levels
rather futile.
Regardless of the drawbacks of these disclosure plans, they do have an
overall desirable effect. In Alaska and South Dakota, before the effective
date of the proposed rules, a large number of previously uninsured
attorneys obtained professional liability insurance. 3'
IV. WHAT SHOULD KENTUCKY Do?
Kentucky currently has a limited system of mandatory coverage.
Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.024 requires that any attorney practicing
in Kentucky in a limited liability entity carry a minimum amount of
professional liability insurance coverage. 139 According to a survey
conducted by the Kentucky Bar Association, approximately 20% of KBA
members practice in a "limited liability entity and have professional
liability insurance coverage or other acceptable adequate financial
coverage. ' 40
Kentucky's Supreme Court established the Client's Security Fund (1)
"to promote public confidence in the administration of justice and the
integrity of the legal profession,"'' and (2) to ensure that every lawyer
137 Id.
138 Id. at 38 ("[T]he new rules provided a positive incentive for uninsured
lawyers to obtain insurance, so that they would not be required to make to clients
the disclosure of lack of insurance.").
'9 Kentucky attorneys practicing in a limited liability entity must carry a
minimum of $250,000 per claim/S500,000 aggregate professional liability
insurance. KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.024.
140 See E-mail from Bruce Davis, supra note 37 (revealing that 2792 of the
14,212 members of the Kentucky Bar Association practice in a limited liability
entity and have either professional liability insurance or some other acceptable
form of coverage).
141 See KY. Sup. CT. R. 3.820(1)(a).
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fulfills his obligation of collectively reimbursing "persons who have lost
money or property as a result of the dishonest conduct of another
lawyer."'' 42 The Fund reimburses clients who have lost money or other
property due to the dishonest acts of their Kentucky attorney. 143 The Fund
is supported by contributions from every practicing attorney in Kentucky. 14
But the Client's Security Fund should not be considered a substitute for
professional liability insurance. The rule governing the Fund provides that
"[t]he loss must be caused by the dishonest conduct of the lawyer and shall
have arisen out of or in the course of a lawyer-client relationship between
the lawyer and the claimant."'45 The definition of "dishonest conduct" is
limited to acts of "theft or embezzlement of money or the wrongful taking
or conversion of money, property or other things of value."146 As a general
rule, the Fund does not cover "[flosses incurred as a result of any negligent
act of malpractice."'' 47 There is an exception, however, that gives the
trustees of the Fund discretion to recognize an excluded claim.148 Even if
a claimant proves entitlement to the exception and is reimbursed accord-
ingly, an attorney cannot consider the Fund a substitute for insurance. The
rule requires any attorney whose conduct requires reimbursement to make
restitution to the Fund.
49
Kentucky should adopt a rule to protect clients from uninsured
attorneys. Currently, many attorneys are not required to carry insurance
under Rule 3.024, and many clients are harmed by their attorneys in ways
that do not amount to "dishonest conduct." 5 ' Even though a mandatory
coverage scheme is not feasible, a mandatory disclosure rule would be
beneficial for all those seeking legal help across the state. The court should
14 2 Id. R. 3.820(1)(b).
"41 Id. R. 3.820(1)(a); see also Ky. BAR ASS'N, CLIENT'S SECURITY FUND,
http://www.kybar.org/intemal.cftn?page=html/law-ethicsclientsecurityfund.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2004) (noting that the current caps on claims filed against the
Client's Security Fund are "$65,000 per claim and $200,000 aggregate payment per
lawyer").
,44 KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.820(3)(a).
"41 Id. R. 3.820(1)(a).
' Id. R. 3.820(10)(c).
147 Id. R. 3.820(10)(d)(1).
141 Id. R. 3.820(10)(e) (stating that there must be a showing of extreme hardship
or special and unusual circumstances.).
'49 Id. R. 3.820(3)(c) (stating that any attorney who does not make restitution
to the Fund may be subject to "suspension, disbarment or denial of an application
for reinstatement").
150 See supra notes 139-149 and accompanying text.
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keep in mind, however, that the rules adopted in other states may not
necessarily be right for Kentucky. The South Dakota rule is too strict, while
the Virginia rule does not offer enough protection for clients.'' Also, the
exemptions offered to attorneys in certain areas of practice may not be
suitable for Kentucky.152 Whatever solution the Kentucky Supreme Court
chooses must be capable of evolving with the practice of law and offer
protection for whomever tomorrow's client shall be.
' The simplicity of the Virginia rule may inhibit its effectiveness because, in
order for disclosure to protect the client, the client must contact the Virginia State
Bar Association to determine whether or not his attorney is insured. See VA. R. CT.
6 § 4, para. 18.
152 See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
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